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Abstract 
We propose a new evolutionary approach to model technological change based on an 
extension of replicator dynamics with recombination and mutation. It gives rise to interactive 
innovation-selection dynamics. The model allows studying the combined effects of selection 
and variety generation on evolutionary-economic change. The developed framework 
describes a population of boundedly rational entrepreneurs who decide each period on the 
allocation of investments in different production technologies. They tend to invest in below-
average cost technologies, just as under replicator dynamics. In addition, they spend a 
constant fraction of investments, captured by mutation and recombination rates, on alternative 
technologies and research on recombinant innovation. As opposed to most previous studies, 
mutation and recombination are here conceptual variables with a concrete behavioral 
interpretation, namely describing the decision rules (heuristics) of investors. We compare the 
dynamics of shares of investments in various technologies for three cases: with constant costs 
of capital, with costs decreasing steadily and exogenously over time, and with costs 
depending on the level of cumulative investments. For each model version, we examine under 
which conditions the coexistence of technological options is feasible and optimal in terms of 
minimising the average cost of investments. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the interaction between selection and variety creation, or innovation, is crucial 
to the process of technological change. Market selection affects the direction and scope of 
innovation research, since it determines which technologies and ideas survive and have a 
good visibility in the market. In evolutionary models of technological change, replicator 
dynamics is typically employed to capture the relationship between variety and market 
competition (Saviotti and Mani, 1995). The applicability and relevance of replicator dynamics 
to model technological evolution has been addressed extensively in the literature (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Bichenhall, 1995; Saviotti and Mani, 1995; Bichenhall et al., 1997; Metcalfe, 
1998). Other models of selection dynamics exist, such as best response, Brown-von 
Neumann-Nash, imitation, mutator, and adaptive dynamics (see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 
2003; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010), but they have been 
rarely applied to model technological change.  
Replicator dynamics assumes that above-average fitness strategies (or technologies) 
diffuse in the population. In fact, replicator dynamics solely addresses the selection process, 
while the generation of new diversity (innovation) is neglected. This motivates the name 
“equilibrium selection theory” (Samuelson, 1997). In a number of evolutionary frameworks 
of technological change, where technological diffusion follows replicator-like dynamics, 
variety creation is modelled as a process independent of existing variety. As a result, 
innovation is independent of selection as well (e.g. Iwai, 1984a,b; Silverberg and Lehnert, 
1993).  
Replicator dynamics is widely used to model adoption of innovation, imitation and 
social learning in economic applications so as to explains patterns of diffusion of certain types 
of behaviors or new technologies in a population. However, it ignores the possibility of 
mistakes, imperfect learning, and costly experimentation with variations and combinations of 
existing technologies occurring during selection and replication processes. As a result, it 
entails a bias towards the best performing alternative. In reality, inefficient or less profitable 
technologies often continue to exist in a market, for a number of reasons. For instance, 
property rights can prevent or slow down the diffusion of certain innovative solutions; tacit 
knowledge is difficult to imitate; and exogenous factors cause uncertainty about the 
profitability of projects (Soete and Turner, 1984).  
In this paper, we propose that adding mutation and recombination to replicator 
dynamics can capture important behavioral and institutional features underlying innovation, 
that is, experimentation with variation and recombination of existing ideas. Similar to the 
process of innovation in biological systems, recombination of existing ideas, products or 
techniques has been recognized by many writers on economic growth and innovation as an 
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important mechanism of variety creation in both economics and technology (e.g., Weitzman, 
1998; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Olsson and Frey, 2002; Tsur and Zemel, 2006). Indeed, 
recombinant, sometimes referred to as modular innovation, has been an important source of 
technological change in the past. For instance, the medieval European printers combined six 
independent existing technologies: paper, movable type, metallurgy, presses, inks and scripts 
(Diamond, 2005); early mill technology incorporated water mill and sailing solutions (Mokyr, 
1990); and more recently, combined cycle gas turbine technology has integrated gas and 
steam turbine technologies, where heat produced during extracting energy from gas is used to 
generate electricity with the steam.  
Thus far, only in evolutionary-economic models of technological change developed 
with evolutionary computation techniques mutation and recombination have received much 
attention (e.g. Birchenhall, 1995; Birchenhall et al., 1997; Yildizoglu, 2002). For instance, 
Birchenhall et al. (1997) proposed to represent technologies as binary strings, where each bit 
captures different technical features or components. This is motivated by the fact that most 
technologies are modular, i.e. they can be decomposed into various modules. In a technology 
context, individuals can deliberately, and with foresight, change specific components of 
technologies, which causes  technological evolution to be different from natural selection.  
In evolutionary-economic models which employ evolutionary algorithms, mutation 
and recombination typically appear as stochastic factors. Their role differs among alternative 
evolutionary dialects from being the only variation operator for creating diversity, the only 
search operator for scanning the parameter space in search for a better solution, a mixture of 
these two, to not being used at all (Eiben and Smith, 2003). This creates a difficulty in 
interpreting mutation and recombination operators in an economic context. Birchenhall 
(1995) and Birchenhall et al. (1997) suggest that recombination and mutation should be 
thought as capturing individual learning: an individual tries out and evaluates new 
technologies through experiments, or considers new mixtures of components (recombination) 
or new variations of existing technological designs (mutation).  
To better grasp the feedback mechanisms between the processes of innovation 
(diversity creation) and selection, we propose a model of technological change which extends 
replicator dynamics with recombination and mutation rates. This gives rise to a general model 
of interactive selection-innovation dynamics. The proposed framework builds upon three lines 
of modelling in theoretical biology: the quasi-species equation (Eigen, 1971; Eigen and 
Schuster, 1979; Hofbauer, 1985; Schuster and Swetina; 1988; Nowak, 1992; Bull et al., 2005; 
Nowak, 2006); replicator-mutator dynamics (Hadeler, 1981; Stadler and Schuster, 1992; 
Bomze and Burger, 1995; Nowak et al., 2001, 2002; Komarowa, 2004; Nowak, 2006); and 
„recombination‟ dynamics (Feldman et al., 1980; Barton, 1995; Boerlijst et al.; 1996; Jacobi 
and Nordahl, 2006).  
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The resulting approach can enrich our understanding of the process of evolutionary 
change in general, and of economic change and innovation in particular. A behavioral-
economic interpretation of the model is that in each period entrepreneurs tend to invest in 
capital characterized by an above-average cost. Similarly to vintage capital models, each type 
of capital is associated with a specific technology (e.g. Iwai, 1984a,b; Silverberg and Lehnert, 
1993). In addition, entrepreneurs devote certain (constant) fractions of investments, captured 
by mutation and recombination, to alternative capital (technologies) and research on 
recombinant innovation.  
Note that we do not simply transfer a model from biology to economics, but adapt it 
to make it suitable for a socio-economic context. In our model, mutation and recombination 
are modelled as conceptual variables with concrete behavioral interpretation. They describe 
heuristic decision rules of boundedly rational investors, i.e. constant fractions of investments 
allocated among innovative activities. An alternative, non-evolutionary model would require 
optimizing investments each period. However, this assumes much rationality on behalf of the 
innovator. In line with the literature on innovation and replicator dynamics we assume limited 
rationality. On the other hand, describing allocation of investments as following random 
mutation and recombination (each period) is not realistic. We therefore adapted the biological 
model by assuming that mutation and recombination are constant over the entire investment 
period. This is consistent with the common assumption in evolutionary economics that rules 
of thumbs and routines describe individual behavior (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
In our model, mutation and recombination determine the probability of the emergence 
of a new technology that is initially absent in the market. This relates to the stylized fact that 
many innovations have emerged from experimenting with and combining existing ideas and 
technologies. Mutation in the model can be interpreted as capturing the inability of investors 
to perfectly assess the profitability of different technologies, costly experimentation, 
deliberate portfolio diversification, and risky investments in new technologies. In line with 
the above ideas of Birchenhall, recombination represents individual learning and 
experimentation through combinations of independent concepts, products or techniques.  
We study evolutionary dynamics for three cases (resulting in three model versions): 
namely, where the unit cost of capital is constant, decreases steadily and exogenously over 
time, and changes in accordance with the level of cumulative investments. The latter reflects 
learning-by-doing or learning-by-experience (Arrow, 1962). The analysis of our model 
provides insights into conditions under which diversification of investments may be cost-
efficient in the long-run. Typically, economists emphasise high costs of maintaining diversity. 
However, diversity may improve the „adaptability‟ of the system, minimize the risks 
associated with unforeseen contingencies, prevent lock-in of a dominant technology, and be 
an important source of innovation (van den Bergh, 2008). We derive the conditions under 
 6 
which the coexistence of technological options is feasible, and we examine which decision 
rules, described by mutation and recombination rates, are optimal in terms of minimizing the 
average cost of investments. The latter is motivated by the fact that the decision how many 
scarce resources to divert from cheapest technologies towards alternative solutions determines 
the dynamics of the average cost of investments in different technologies over the investment 
period.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the quasi-
species equation, mutator-replicator dynamics and recombination dynamics. In Section 3, we 
present the new model of replicator dynamics extended with mutation and recombination. In 
Section 4, we derive equilibria and investigate their stability, for three different cases. In 
Section 5, we examine the dynamics of the average cost of investments under different 
mutation and recombination rates. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Replicator-mutator, quasi-species, and recombinant-dynamics 
models 
In economic-evolutionary models of technological change, replicator-type dynamics 
predominates. Replicator dynamics was first formulated by Taylor and Jonker (1978). It 
describes how the frequencies of various strategies within a population change over time 
according to their pay-offs (fitness). Since the pay-offs depend on the frequencies of other 
strategies within a population, this creates a feedback loop mechanism (Samuelson, 1997). 
Ultimately, the selection process ensures that the fittest strategies (technologies) diffuse in the 
population. Formally, replicator dynamics can be written as: 
ix = )( ffx ii  ,        (1) 
where fi is a fitness function; and f =Σixifi is the average fitness. 
In evolutionary models of industry dynamics, replicator dynamics determines 
differential growth of firms given production constraints or dynamics of consumer 
preferences (Windrum, 2007). Typically, fitness fi is interpreted as profits or productivity, 
while xi captures (changing) market shares of different products or technologies (e.g., 
Windrum et al., 1998, 2005), or differential growth of productive capacity of firms (e.g., 
Soete and Turner, 1984; Metcalfe, 1988).  
Replicator dynamics, however, provides an incomplete representation of evolution. It 
entails a bias towards the currently best-performing alternative(s). In most cases, it rules out 
the coexistence of variety, unless various strategies achieve exactly the same fitness. 
According to Young (1998) there is insufficient empirical data to provide evidence for 
replicator dynamics offering the best description of the process of decision-making or of 
individuals adapting their behavior in response to others. Similarly, replicator dynamics may 
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not grasp all important features of the behavior of firms. It ensures that the most profitable 
solutions ultimately dominate the market, but ignores the possibility of imperfect learning, of 
errors occurring during the process of replication, and of costly experimentation during 
market development. These are, however, important and established aspects of boundedly 
rational behavior. As argued already in Section 1, they can be captured by mutation and 
recombination. 
Economists using evolutionary methods, both in the study and application of 
evolutionary games and in neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economics of technical change, 
have given surprisingly little attention to mutation and recombination. Notable exceptions are 
Foster and Young (1990), Canning (1992), Young (1993), and Kandori et al. (1993), who 
propose models of adaptive learning in the context of repeated 2x2 games. Here, mistakes by 
players constantly disturb the process of learning and thus selection dynamics. Independent 
mutations, introduced at the individual player level, are interpreted as players being incapable 
of undertaking an optimization calculation or as one of the players being replaced with a new 
one who knows nothing about the game and thus selects a strategy at random (Kandori, 
1993). Alternatively, in Foster and Young (1990) mutations disturb aggregate dynamics. 
Here, mutation captures variability in pay-offs due to an environmental influence or 
immigrant players. In these models, examination of the impact of random mutations is an 
important tool for determining the stability of equilibrium. A unique stationary distribution of 
strategies is found in the limit distribution as mutation goes to zero, referred to as a 
„stochastically stable strategy‟.  
Within theoretical biology, three alternative models have combined selection and 
innovation in the most condensed way: namely, replicator-mutator, quasi-species, and 
recombination dynamics. The simplest possible model allowing for erroneous replications is 
the quasispecies equation (Eigen, 1971; Eigen and Schuster, 1979; Hofbauer, 1985; Schuster 
and Swetina; 1988; Bull et al., 2005; Nowak, 2006). The term „quasi-species‟ originally 
referred to an ensemble of similar genomic sequences (RNA molecules) generated by a 
mutation-selection process. The equation assumes constant fitness selection with the 
possibility of an erroneous replication defined by a mutation rate. Formally, we have:  
ix = ijijj j xfqfx  ,       (2) 
The mutation matrix Q=[qij] is a stochastic matrix, with entry qij denoting the 
probability that replication of strategy i will result in strategy j, with Σjqij=1. The equation 
was initially proposed to model the replication of genetic information coded on a (binary) 
sequence of values. Then, 
)(
)1( ijij
HLH
ij ppq

 , with p the mutation rate per bit, L the 
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length of the binary sequence, and Hij the Hamming distance between strings i and j ( the 
number of bits in those strings differ).
1
  
For low mutation rates, quasi-species dynamics typically renders a stable coexistence 
of various strategies. However, for high mutation rates, the shares of strategies start to behave 
in a chaotic manner. The reason is that, for high mutation rates (above 0.5), the larger the 
distance between i and j, the higher the probability of erroneous replication of i into j: 
)]1log()[log()1( pppp
H
q
ijij HLH
ij
ij


 
.    (3) 
For low mutation rates (below 0.5), the probability of erroneous replication is lower the larger 
the distance between strings i and j (L-Hij). 
In the case of quasi-species with no „back mutation‟ (causing a return from the mutant 
to the original strategy), a critical error threshold can be identified beyond which the strategy 
with the highest fitness will become extinct. It corresponds to the rate at which the 
replacement rates of different species are equal. Interestingly, if a model incorporates back 
mutation, there is no strict error threshold (Bull et al., 2005). In the context of economic 
dynamics, back mutation may capture the decision of a player to return to the old strategy 
after a period of experimentation with a new strategy.  
In a constant selection environment, as is assumed in the quasi-species equation, 
mutation tends to reduce average fitness. The optimum mutation that maximizes average 
fitness is then zero (see, Kimura, 1967). However, in a changing environment some positive 
rate of mutation may be necessary for improving adaptation. Willensdorfer and Nowak (2005) 
show that with frequency-dependent selection, mutation can enhance the average fitness of 
the population. This can be captured by an alternative model: namely, replicator-mutator 
dynamics. It assumes that fitness changes depending on the structure of the population. 
Replicator-mutator dynamics has been applied in population genetics, biochemistry, and 
models of language learning (Hadeler, 1981; Stadler and Schuster, 1992; Bomze and Burger, 
1995; Nowak et al., 2001, 2002; Komarowa, 2004; Nowak, 2006). It can be written as:  
ix =  ijijjj xfqfx .         (4) 
Here, fj is a function of frequencies of all strategies present in the population. This equation 
contains both replicator dynamics and the quasi-species equation as special cases (Nowak, 
2006). If the matrix Q=[qij] is an identity matrix, the equation reduces to replicator dynamics; 
if selection is defined on a constant fitness landscape, it becomes the quasi-species equation.  
                                                 
1
 The string representation has been employed in evolutionary-economic models to code consumer 
preferences (Aversi et al., 1997), production designs (Windrum and Birchenhall 1998, 2005), firm 
routines (Kwasnicka and Kwasnicki, 1992), production rules in Cobweb models (Arifovic 1994, 1995; 
Dawid and Kopel, 1998), production functions (Birchenhall, 1995; Birchenhall et al., 1997), pricing 
strategies (Curzon Price, 1997), and strategies in a Prisoner‟s Dilemma game (Axelrod, 1987; Miller, 
1996). 
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 A third relevant model is „recombination‟ dynamics. So far, this has been mainly 
applied to model sexually-reproducing organisms with a constant reproduction rate and no 
mutation (Feldman et al., 1980; Barton, 1995). Only a few authors combine it with the quasi-
species equation, although with the simplification of keeping reproduction rates constant 
(Jacobi and Nordahl, 2006; Boerlijst et al., 1996). The quasi-species equation with 
recombination can be described as (Jacobi and Nordahl, 2006): 
 
lm
ikkll
lm
ki xxaxaVx        (5) 
Here, 
i
lm
i
i
k
lm
k TQV with Q a mutation matrix and 
lm
kT  a crossover operator that describes 
the probability that the recombination of parents l and m will result in k offspring. In the case 
of uniform crossover, offspring k is created by choosing bits with equal probability from one 
of the parents, and thus lm
hlm
iT
 2  if O(k,l,m)=1, and 0 otherwise. O(k,l,m) is equal to 1 at 
each position where the parents l and m are identical; in this case the same bit appears in the 
offspring k.  
The presence of recombination operating on pairs of sequences gives rise to non-
linearity in the growth term. As a consequence,  2 i ii xa is imposed to ensure 
normalization of the population ( 1
i
ix ). For an alternative specification of recombination 
in quasi-species see also Boerlijst et al. (1996). This study shows that in the quasi-species 
model, for low mutation rates, recombination enhances overall fitness, while reducing 
diversity; but for high mutation rates, recombination typically causes chaotic behavior of the 
system.  
 
3.  A general evolutionary model of selection, mutation, and 
recombinant innovation 
In this section, we propose a formal model of technological substitution. The basic entities are 
firms, which produce a homogenous commodity using different production techniques. Each 
technology is associated with, and requires investments in, specific capital. The evolution of 
shares of different types of capital, and thus technologies, is modelled using replicator 
dynamics extended with mutation and recombination. We refer to this as „interactive 
innovation-selection dynamics‟, which we apply to model the process of capital selection and 
innovation. First, we develop the general framework for n technologies. In Section 4, we will 
present a detailed analysis for the case of three technologies.
2
  
                                                 
2
 At a conceptual level, our model bears some similarity to the framework developed by Soete and 
Turner (1984). However, they do not use replicator dynamics to describe market competition as well as 
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The general framework describes the dynamics of n technologies competing for 
adoption. We assume an infinite population, in which entrepreneurs invest in different 
production technologies based on their relative unit cost. In particular, they tend to invest in 
the below-average cost technologies. Thus, the share of the cheapest technology is expected 
to increase over time. In addition, entrepreneurs may devote a certain percentage of 
investments, described by a mutation rate μ, to alternative technologies. The mutation rate can 
be seen to capture the imperfect, myopic or local nature of search for returns on investment. It 
can be also regarded as a „rule of thumb‟ aimed at devoting a certain fraction of investments 
for the purpose of diversification and experimentation with new variations. Next, a fraction r 
of capital, described by the recombination rate, is devoted to fundamental research on 
recombinant innovation. This process may lead to the emergence of a new technological 
option that is initially absent in the population.  
 Changes in the market shares of the already existing technologies are described by 
(time indices t are omitted to simplify the notation):  
iijij
e
ji
e
ijj jijji
xfxxrqfxx    ,,         for i=1,..,m   (6) 
while changes in the market shares for new emerging technologies e, which are initially 
absent on the market, are as follows:  
 eijij
e
jij jijje
xfxxrqfxx   , ,           for e=m+1,..,n     (7) 
Here, m denotes the number of existing technologies, and n is the number of new emerging 
technologies; xi is the share of the capital stock embodying technology i in the total stock of 
capital used for production in the industry. The above equations consist of three parts:  
 
(i) The expression j jijj qfx   implies that  profits jj fx  generated by capital j are allocated 
between the different technologies according to the allocation scheme Q=[qji]. In particular, 
the matrix Q describes the fractions (probabilities) of investments in j being directed towards 
technology i ( 1
j
jiq ). Accordingly, the fraction qjj=1- μ of profits generated by capital j 
is being re-invested in this capital, while a share μ of profits is invested in other types of 
capital. We assume that investors tend to diversify investments by allocating the fraction μ of 
profits equally among other n-1 technologies: qji=μ
1
1
n
 for j i. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
their model does not capture technological learning and recombinant innovation, which are important 
aspects of our framework. 
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(ii) The expression ijij
e
ji
e
ji xxr  ,,  in equation 6 is a fraction of capital i devoted towards 
research on recombinant innovation, i.e. on how to combine components from parent 
technologies j and i to give rise to a new technology e. Here, the parameter r is the 
recombination rate, while γei,j (=γ
e
j,i) is a binary variable that takes a value 1 if i and j can be 
recombined into e and 0 otherwise. This reflects that not all technologies can be recombined. 
δej,i and δ
e
i,j can be interpreted as weights at which technologies j and i are being combined, 
with δej,i+ δ
e
i,j=1.  
According to equation 6, the fraction of capital i allocated to recombinant innovation 
depends on the share of capital j devoted to recombinant innovation (
e
ji
e
ijr ,,  xj). This is 
motivated by the fact that technology e is assumed to be modular, i.e. it requires as inputs 
specific combinations of technologies i and j, namely: an amount of 
j
e
ij x, of technology i 
and 
i
e
ji x,  of technology j. To illustrate with an example, combined-cycle gas turbine 
technologies integrate gas and steam turbines to more efficiently produce electricity, namely 
by capturing the energy contained in the exhaust gases of the gas turbine to feed into the 
steam turbine. Here, the gas turbine defines two-thirds and the steam unit one-third of the 
capacity of the combined-cycle technology (EIA, 2008). One might think of capital i and j as 
inputs in the production of technology e. An entrepreneur, who owns capital i and is 
interested in devoting some fraction of it to the process of recombinant innovation, will not do 
so unless capital j (provided by other entrepreneurs) is available for the processes. If one of 
the parent technologies i or j is absent, the probability of recombinant innovation is zero. 
Therefore, the entrepreneur is likely to condition the amount of capital i, which he intends to 
devote towards recombinant innovation, on the amount of capital j allocated to the process.  
As a result of various types of recombinant innovation (given n existing technologies), the 
shares of technology e increases by jiij
e
ji xxr  , in equation 7
3
; 
 
(iii) ixf  is the average fitness in the industry. It is subtracted in equations 6 and 7 to make sure 
the sum of shares equals one.  
 
      We assume that technologies are modular, i.e. composed of many components. We 
refrain from specifying which dimensions of incumbent technologies or how many of them 
are being recombined during the process of recombinant innovation. This would result in ad 
                                                 
3
 The implicit assumption here is that an amount of 
j
e
ij x, of capital i and i
e
ji x,  of capital j are 
combined to generate a new technology e, whose share then increases with xixj . For this reason the δ 
parameters do not appear in equation 7. 
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hoc assumptions. By making a simplifying assumption that technical features from two 
technologies are recombined in specific proportions (δei,j and δ
e
j,i) we allow for alternative 
interpretations of technological components and their functionality. The new emerging 
technology can offer novel services or technical characteristics, or it may fulfil the same 
functions as its „parent‟ technologies but more efficiently.  
We define the fitness of a technology as:  
fit = a - cit.               (9) 
The parameter a (1) represents the price of a homogenous product in the industry which 
does not vary between technologies. One might think of fitness fit as a mark-up or per unit 
profits and fitxit as total profits associated with the capital embodying technology i. An 
example is electricity, which is a homogenous good produced with different energy 
technologies, and thus characterised by different costs of production but by a single consumer 
price.  
We consider three alternative cost functions corresponding to different versions of the 
model, namely: constant costs, costs decreasing steadily and exogenously over time, and 
dynamics with cost reductions occurring along a learning curve. In case selection operates on 
constant unit costs:   
cit=  ci0,             (10a) 
with c i0  (0,1). 
Alternatively, unit cost decrease over time according to: 
cit = 
bgt
ci

0   
       
(10b) 
with a, b, c, g constants. Here, costs decrease automatically over time.  
Finally, according to a third cost specification a unit cost of technology i falls over 
time in proportion to the level of cumulative investment in its installed capacity, that is along 
a learning curve (Arrow, 1962): 
cit = ci0 iitI
         (10c) 
Here, ci0 is the initial cost, βi (0,1) the learning rate (also referred to as the elasticity or 
learning index), and Iit cumulative investments in technology i at time t. The equation implies 
that with every doubling of total installed capacity specific costs are reduced by a progress 
rate (speed of learning) equal to 2
-β
. Given that we are working in an infinite population 
framework (due to replicator dynamics), cumulative investments in technology i are defined 
as being equal to the cumulative shares of investments in this technology: 
Iit= 
t
itx
0
 dt        (11) 
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 The proposed framework is a rather simple model of technological change, where 
firms choose techniques so as to minimize the total cost of production, but also direct some of 
their investments towards diversification and recombinant innovation. No assumption is made 
about growth of demand, i.e. technological change is purely supply driven. The model allows 
studying an impact of various behavioral assumptions about entrepreneurs‟ innovation 
activities on the process of technological change level.  
  
4. Model dynamics  
In this section, we study properties of the system (equations 6-11) proposed in Section 3.
4
 We 
reduce the number of dimensions (technologies) from n to three to better grasp core properties 
of the model. We examine the dynamics resulting from the competition process between three 
technologies: two exist initially, and one emerges. In Section 4.1 we assume that technologies 
are characterised by constant costs or by costs that decrease steadily over time, while in 
Section 4.2 we consider the case of costs that change along a learning curve. In each case, we 
investigate conditions under which the coexistence of options is feasible. In addition, in 
Section 5 we examine dynamics of the average cost of investments for each version of the 
model. Whenever possible, we derive analytical solutions. Otherwise we investigate 
numerically properties of the system (parameter values are given in Appendix A1). The 
values of parameters were chosen covering a variety of (relative) initial costs and learning 
rates of technologies so as to capture a wide spectrum of possible outcomes. 
 
4.1 Innovation-selection dynamics with constant costs and cost decreasing 
steadily over time 
Here, we consider a model system for two cases: (i) characterised by a constant unit cost 
(equation 10a):  fit= fi=a - ci0; and (ii) by unit costs that decrease steadily over time (equation 
10b): fit = a -
bgt
ci

0  . Note, that (i) is a special case of (ii) for g=0 and b=1. A version of the 
model with constant unit costs can be interpreted as describing mature industries, where the 
potential for cost reduction due to learning or innovative activities (R&D) is limited. Costs 
decreasing steadily over time capture technological learning-from-experience.    
The three dimensional system is described by the following set of equations: 
fxxrxxfxffxx ttttttt 1213322111 5.05.0)1(         (12a) 
fxxrxxfxffxx ttttttt 2213311222 )1(5.05.0)1(        (12b)  
                                                 
4
 We use Mathematica 4.1 to derive analytical and numerical solutions to the model, as well as to 
generate graphs (Wolfram Research Inc., 2001). 
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fxxrxxfxffxx ttttttt 3212211333 5.05.0)1(   ;     (12c) 
with x3,0=0, ttt xxx 213 1  , and ttt xfxfxff 332211  . 
Initially there are two technologies present on the market: x10 , x20 > 0 and  x10 + x20  = 1. Note 
that we set γ312=1, γ
1
23=0, and γ
2
13=0 in equations 1, 2 and 3, respectively, assuming that 
Technologies 1 and 2 may be recombined to give rise to a novel Technology 3. These 
assumptions also holds for the case considered in Section 4.2.  
 
No recombination 
In the absence of recombination (r=0), the system 12a-c reduces to the quasi-species model, 
whose properties have been studied extensively in the literature (Nowak et al., 2000). The 
solution of quasi-species is given by the vector of frequencies (x1,x2,x3) which corresponds to 
the largest eigenvalue of the matrix of the linearized system (Nowak, 1992). In a special case, 
for all technologies characterized by the same fitness: f10=f20=f30, the symmetric solution with 
xi=1/n always exists and is stable for μ below a certain threshold level μ1 (<0.66). For 
mutation equal 0.66, three technologies coexist with equal shares regardless of their relative 
unit costs. A second, asymmetric solution, where the share of investment in technology i 
dominates the investment portfolio, can be identified (i.e. xi=a and xj=(1-a)/(n-1) for i j, 
with a depending on the relative costs), and is stable for μ above a certain threshold level μ2 
(see Nowak et al., 2001; Komarova, 2004; Nowak, 2006). For μ1 <μ< μ2, one of these 
solutions emerges depending on the initial conditions. These results hold for both versions of 
the model with constant costs and costs decreasing over time. This makes sense, as constant 
costs is a limit case of decreasing costs. 
 
No mutation 
In the absence of mutation (μ=0) but for a positive value of recombination rate (r>0), the 
system described by equation 12a-c results in a novel model of replicator dynamics extended 
with recombination. Table 1 presents four feasible solutions to this system.  
 
Table 1. Solutions to the system 12a-c in the absence of mutation (μ=0) 
no x1 x2 x3 
1 0 0 1 
2 0 1 0 
3 1 0 0 
4 
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 Solutions 1-3 in Table 1 correspond to situations where a single technology has taken 
over the market. The dominance of a new, emerging technology 3 (Solution 1) is stable only 
if it exhibits the lowest unit costs (c3<c1 and c3<c2)
5
. Its stability does not depend on the 
recombination rate. Alternatively, the dominance of one of the two incumbent technologies is 
determined by the recombination rate and the weights with which the two technologies are 
combined in the process of recombinant innovation. In particular, Solution 2 (0,1,0) is stable 
if c2<c3 and c2<c1+δr, while solution 1 (1,0,0) is stable if c1<c3 and c1<c2+(1-δ)r. For a 
sufficiently high value of r, one of the incumbent technologies will end up dominating the 
market if it exhibits the lowest unit cost of capital. All in all, the relative costs of technologies 
determine the shares of technologies and their stability. This suggests that authorities aimed at 
promoting a specific technology mix (e.g., for sustainable electricity production) may need to 
intervene using appropriate subsidies or taxes to achieve relative costs that are „right‟. 
Interesting from an economic view is that solution 4 corresponds to the coexistence of 
three technologies. The eigenvalues of this solution (see Table A2 in the appendix) may yield 
complex numbers depending on the relative costs of technologies, the recombination rate and 
weights at which Technologies 1 and 2 are combined to give rise to Technology 3. Figure 1 
shows how eigenvalues corresponding to Solution 5 change depending on the recombination 
rate. Here, different stability regimes can be identified: for r  (0, 0.025), one of the 
eigenvalues is real and negative, and the other two are complex with negative real parts, so 
the fixed point is stable. For r (0.025, 0.2) three eigenvalues are real and negative so the 
fixed point is also stable. Finally, for r (0.2, 1) two of the eigenvalues are real and negative, 
while one is real and positive, so that the fixed point is unstable. This implies that coexistence 
of different technologies on the market is possible and persistent only for low values of 
recombination, i.e. below 0.2. In fact, it is even unrealistic to expect that entrepreneurs would 
invest larger shares of their profits in R&D on recombinant innovation, given that it is a 
process with an uncertain outcome. Moreover, a large fraction of profits devoted towards 
research on recombinant innovation may wipe out incumbent technologies from the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 See the Appendix 2. 
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Figure 1. Eigenvalues corresponding to Solution 5 for a=1, c10=0.1, c20=0.2, c30=0.4,and δ =0.5.
6
 
 
Where costs decrease steadily with time, solutions can be obtained by substituting 
fitness functions described by equation 10(b) into the solutions in Table 1. This implies 
treating time as “frozen”.7  Solution 4 corresponding to the coexistence of three options, in the 
limit, as t goes to infinity, approaches the point (0,0,1) with technology 3 dominating the 
market in the long run. Therefore, when costs decrease steadily, investment in recombinant 
innovation alone prevent the coexistence of options over time.  
 
Mutation and recombination 
Below, we examine numerically the trajectories of shares of investments in different 
technologies in the presence of mutation and recombination. This relates to the fact that in the 
presence of recombination and mutation, the process of innovation-selection dynamics has 8 
possible solutions whose stability and feasibility is difficult to assess analytically. The 
solutions are complex functions of unit costs and other parameters.
8
 For the model version 
with constant unit costs, the phase diagrams in Figure 2a present ten trajectories of shares of 
technologies 1 and 2 (x1t,x2t), while the diagrams in Figure 2b do this for technologies 1 and 3 
(x1t,x3t). Parameter values (a, δ, r, μ, c10, c20, and c30) associated with different trajectories in 
each diagram are summarized in the Appendix (Table A1). Their values were chosen to depict 
the relevant range of possible dynamic patterns of (x1t,x2t,x3t). Initial values of state variables 
are x10=x20=0.5, and x30=0 in each case. The presence of mutation and recombination always 
results in the coexistence of three technological options (Figures 2a and 2b). The diversity of 
technologies is stable for a wide variety of combinations of parameter values (i.e. relative 
                                                 
6
 This parameter values captures a case of a new, emerging technology with an initially high unit cost 
competing for adoption with two incumbent technologies with relatively low unit costs. 
7
 This does not always allow for the correct solution to be derived (Wiggins, 2003). To avoid errors, the 
function x(t) should be found, and its asymptotic properties examined. However, it is not always 
possible to derive an explicit function x(t). Here, the proposed system involves products of shares xi 
and time t, so that there is no simple (linear) separation of the solutions to provide time-invariant 
equations and oscillations free of initial conditions. 
8
 We do not provide the expressions here because of their complexity and length. 
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costs, recombination and mutation), for both versions of the model: with constant costs and 
costs decreasing steadily over time. In the latter case, points corresponding to different 
solutions tend to show more clustering (we do not show these phase diagrams here) than in 
the case of constant costs (Figure 2). This implies that in the version of the model with costs 
decreasing steadily over time, different investment strategies are likely to result in similar 
outcomes in terms of the diversity of technologies present in the market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Phase diagram (x1t,x2t) in the presence of mutation  (b) Phase diagram (x1t,x3t) in the presence of  mutation 
        and recombination                           and recombination       
Figure 2. Phase diagrams for initial conditions: x10=0.5 x20=0.5, and x30=0.  
 
 
All in all, investments in recombinant innovation alone typically rules out coexistence of a 
variety of technologies in production - regardless of whether investments in diversification 
are absent or not. Investments in diversification are required to prevent lock-in to a single 
technology. If entrepreneurs invest in both diversification and recombinant innovation, the 
coexistence of options on the market is guaranteed. In this case, technology 3 captures larger 
shares than in the absence of investments in diversification. 
 
4.2 Innovation-selection dynamics with costs changing along a learning curve  
In this section, we consider the system with cost reductions occurring along a learning curve. 
Here, technological fitness is expressed as: fit=a-ci0 

t
it
ix
0
)(

. The system then becomes: 
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    (13c).                 
 
Unlike in the previous section, derivation of general results here is difficult since 
technology fitness depends on cumulative shares of technologies, which implies fitness-
dependent selection. The resulting system is therefore far too complicated to derive analytical 
solutions, even in the absence of mutation; below, we investigate the properties of this system 
numerically. Typically, the solutions are complex numbers. Phase diagrams in Figures 3a to 
3f show the trajectories of the real parts of the solutions for the same parameter values as in 
the phase diagrams in previous section (see Appendix A1). Figures 3a, 3c and 3e show, 
respectively, the trajectory of solutions (x1, x2) in the absence of mutation, in the absence of 
recombination, and in the presence of mutation and recombination. Analogously, Figures 3b, 
3d and 3f depict phase diagrams for the trajectories of (x1,x3).  
The results suggest that the dominance of a single technology occurs in the absence of 
mutation (Figures 3a and 3b), which is a similar result to the one obtained in the previous 
section. Thus, investments in recombinant innovation alone typically render the dominance of 
the single technology, reducing diversity of technologies on the market. In the presence of 
investments in diversification, regardless of whether recombination is present or not (Figures 
3c-e), model dynamics lead to the coexistence of three technological options. The presence of 
investments in recombinant innovation causes technology 3 to capture a larger share of the 
market than in the case such investments are absent. 
These results suggests that if entrepreneurs invest all their profits only in recombinant 
innovation, the market is likely to become locked-in into a single technology. This may not be 
a desirable outcome: a new technology may become dominant before it is mature enough, 
while a reduced diversity of technologies would limit the scope for future innovation 
activities and the improvement and growth of a possibly better alternative. Investments in 
diversification help to avoid such a lock-in. The question then arises how costly will be 
diversification for the different model versions, which we examine in the next section. 
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  (a) Phase diagram (x1t,x2t) in the absence of mutation (μ=0)           (b) Phase diagram (x1t,x3t) in the absence of mutation (μ=0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (c) Phase diagram (x1t,x2t) in the absence of recombination               (d) Phase diagram (x1t,x3t) in the absence of recombination   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(e) Phase diagram (x1t,x2t) in the presence of mutation        (f) Phase diagram (x1t,x3t) in the presence of mutation  
  and recombination                and recombination     
  Figure 3. Phase diagrams for initial conditions: x10=0.5 x20=0.5, and x30=0  
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5. Dynamics of average cost and optimal diversity 
Maintaining a variety of technological options has benefits at the level of both markets and 
firms. For instance, firms that invest in a number of research projects are capable of 
modifying existing technologies more easily and applying them later across different products 
and markets at lower costs (Granstrand, 1998). Nevertheless, economists often emphasize the 
high costs associated with maintaining diversity, such as lost advantages of scale and 
specialization (i.e. increasing returns to scale, including traditional economies of scale); 
organizational costs associated with coordination and integration of multiple projects; and the 
cost of carrying out multi-disciplinary R&D. One might think that the total cost of 
investments would be minimized if in each period investors allocate all investment to the 
cheapest technologies. However, this may not be true in the long run as it neglects the 
possibility of cost decreases through learning and R&D, and new technologies emerging 
through recombinant innovation.  
The profit motive alone is likely to be insufficient to provide entrepreneurs with 
incentives to innovate at the socially optimal rate (Berzel, 1968). In particular, where 
technology costs depend on cumulative installed capacity, producers may decide to postpone 
investing in initially expensive technologies, until investments by others reduce their unit 
cost. This resembles an Investor‟s Dilemma situation as described by Christenson (2003), 
where large companies are reluctant to invest in new technologies before they become 
profitable. However, without costly investments in installed capacity of new technologies, for 
instance, renewable energy plants, these technologies may never become cost-competitive.   
In this section, we examine the effect of various investment heuristics on the 
dynamics of average cost of investments in alternative versions of the model. The conducted 
analysis can be informative about which investments strategies of individual entrepreneurs, 
captured by mutation and recombination, are socially optimal in the sense of ensuring a 
diversity of technologies at the lowest possible average cost of investments (at the industry 
level). In fact, governments have already attempted to encourage producers to diversify 
investments with various policy instruments. A relevant example here is the case of 
Renewable Obligations (RO) introduced in 2002 in the UK. It required electricity suppliers to 
deliver a certain percentage of their annual supply to final consumers from a list of renewable 
energy technologies. As a result, suppliers were obliged to buy a certain percentage of total 
energy from relatively expensive energy sources.  
The average cost of investments is defined formally as an average of unit costs of 
capital weighted by shares of this capital in the industry at time t: Σi xit cit . Appendix A3 offers 
a derivation of recombination rate that minimises the average cost of investments, for three 
different versions of the model. Below, we illustrate numerically the evolution of the average 
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cost of investments over time for different mutation and recombination values. The initial 
conditions are set as a=b=g=1, c10=0.1, c20=0.2, c30=0.4, x10=x20=0.5, x30=0, δ=0.5, 
β1=β2=0.05, and β3=0.35, which captures the case of a new, emerging technology with an 
initially high unit cost competing for adoption with two incumbent technologies with 
relatively low unit costs.  
Figures 4–6 present, respectively, the results for the three versions of the model: with 
constant unit costs; with costs decreasing steadily and exogenously over time; and with costs 
following the learning curve. For the versions of the model with constant unit costs, a higher 
recombination rate (for a given mutation rate) in Figure 4a or a higher mutation rate (for a 
given recombination rate) in Figure 4b contribute to a larger average cost of investments at 
any point of time. The reason is that investments in alternative technologies and research on 
recombinant innovation, as described by mutation and recombination, only distract capital 
from the cheapest technological option.  
Similarly, in the model with unit costs falling steadily over time, higher 
recombination rates (for a given mutation rate) translate into higher average costs of 
investments at any point of time. On the other hand, for a given recombination rate, the effect 
of an increase in the mutation rate on the average cost depends on the time at which the latter 
is being evaluated. If the average cost is evaluated after t>20 (Figure 5b), the higher mutation 
rate results in a lower average cost of investments. This suggests that diversification of 
technologies by individual entrepreneurs can be socially beneficial (i.e. in terms of lowering 
the average cost of investments in the industry) if the time horizon of investments is 
sufficiently long.  
In the model with costs decreasing along a learning curve, the effect of an increase in 
the recombination rate on the average cost depends on the time when the latter is evaluated. 
Generally, a higher recombination rate tends to lower the average cost over time (Figure 6a). 
On the other hand, for a given recombination rate, an increase in the mutation rate increases 
the average cost. This relates to the fact that if provided with sufficient learning opportunities, 
a new emerging technology may achieve a very low unit cost over time. Investments in 
diversification (in incumbent technologies) may slow down this process by diverting capital 
away from the technology with the highest potential for cost reduction. In  the absence of 
such investments in diversification, the new technology is likely to dominate the market, 
reducing diversity of technologies therein (see Section 4.2), and moreover to achieve the 
lowest possible unit costs which in turn reduces the average cost of investments. In other 
words, a trade-off between diversity, recombinant innovation, and the cost of diversification 
is at stake here. To conclude, in the versions of the model with costs decreasing steadily over 
time the optimal strategy, in terms of minimizing investment costs, is to invest only in 
diversification of the investment portfolio (Figure 5a). In the model with cost reductions 
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occurring along a learning curve, the lowest average cost of investments is achieved in the 
absence of investments in diversification. Here, the optimal strategy involves investing solely 
in recombinant innovation (Figure 6b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) μ=0.3       (b) r=0.5 
 
Figure 4.  Average costs over time for the version of the model with constant unit costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) μ =0.3       (b) r=0.5 
 
Figure 5. Average costs over time for the version of the model with unit costs decreasing 
steadily over time  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) μ =0.3                         (b) r=0.5 
 
Figure 6. Average costs over time for the version of the model with unit costs decreasing 
alone the learning curve  
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6. Conclusions 
Modeling the process of technological change through the method of replicator dynamics 
predominates in the literature on innovation and evolutionary economics. This approach 
depicts behavior of producers and investors as adopting above-average performing 
technologies, whose market shares then increase. Nevertheless, it ignores the possibility of 
mistakes by boundedly rational investors and costly experimentation with new variations and 
combinations of existing technologies, even though these are important and well-documented 
aspects of technological evolution. In the process of technological change, the presence of 
new solutions at a given moment of time depends on technological progress and market 
opportunities achieved up to that date. The latter are the result of progressive market selection 
over time. Since selection acts on existing variety, the processes of selection and variety 
creation are interdependent. This is, however, not captured by replicator dynamics.  
The aim of this paper was to grasp the interaction between selection and innovation in 
the simplest possible way. With this purpose in mind, we proposed an extension of replicator 
dynamics with recombination and mutation. It gives rise to interactive innovation-selection 
dynamics. Until now, this approach has not received any attention in economics, even though 
it captures all aspects of evolution in the most simple, condensed way. The framework was 
interpreted here as describing a population of boundedly-rational entrepreneurs. In each 
period, they decide on the allocation of investment capital among different technological 
options. They tend to invest in capital associated with below-average cost technologies, just 
as under replicator dynamics. In addition, they devote a certain fraction of investments, 
captured by mutation and recombination, to alternative technologies and research on 
recombinant innovation. In this context, mutation and recombination are conceptual variables 
with concrete behavioral interpretation which depicts the heuristic decision rules of 
entrepreneurs. Mutation can capture a range of potential behaviors: namely, the inability of 
investors to perfectly assess the profitability of different technologies, costly experimentation, 
deliberate portfolio diversification, and risky investments in new technologies. Investments in 
recombinant innovation can stimulate the emergence of a new technological option, which is 
initially absent from the market. The model allows comparing the cases in which all firms 
behave as if they were rational (in the absence of mutation and recombination, i.e. pure 
replicator dynamics) and in which they are boundedly rational (in the presence of mutation 
and recombination, i.e. innovation-selection dynamics). 
We studied evolutionary dynamics for three cases: namely, where selection operates 
on technologies characterized by constant costs; by costs that decrease steadily and 
exogenously over time; and by costs that change depending on the level of cumulative 
investments. The results revealed that, for each resulting model version, mutation enhances 
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diversity. In the absence of mutation, a single technology typically ends up dominating the 
market. Thus, to stimulate the coexistence of technological options in the long run, 
experimenting with variations of existing technologies is recommendable. On the other hand, 
a high recombination rate increases the probability that a new technology emerges and will 
ultimately dominate investments, which may limit diversity. The role of recombination in 
ensuring coexistence of a variety of options is a new finding in the evolutionary-economics 
literature. 
The results also suggest that the effect of mutation and recombination on the average 
costs of investments varies between alternative versions of the model. In the model with 
constant cost of capital, more investments in diversification and innovation research increases 
the average cost of investments in different technologies. Here, a socially optimal rate of 
investment in these innovation activities is zero. For an alternative model version, where costs 
change steadily over time, more investment in diversification decreases the average cost; 
while more investment in recombinant innovation typically increases it. These relationships 
are reversed where unit costs decrease along a learning curve. Here, the lowest possible 
average cost of investments was achieved in the absence of investments in diversification. 
The optimal, cost-minimizing strategy was investing solely in recombinant innovation. 
However, if all entrepreneurs adopt such a cost-minimising strategy, this can result in a new 
technology dominating the market, while reducing diversity of technologies.  
The analysis of the properties of replicator dynamics extended with mutation and 
recombination provides insight into the process of induced technological change. Policy-
makers often face a trade-off between short- and long-term economic benefits, or between 
private and social benefits. Firms investing solely in the currently most profitable or cheapest 
technologies may give rise to socially suboptimal outcomes at the industry level (i.e. a high 
average cost of investments). The question arises how many scarce resources should be 
diverted from incumbent technologies towards alternatives and innovation research. It was 
shown here that the benefits from increasing returns (due to specialization) and from 
recombinant innovation (due to diverse options) depend on opportunities for cost reduction, 
investment heuristics of entrepreneurs, and the time horizon.  
Possible extensions of the model involve studying multi-parent recombination and 
inclusion of a stochastically or endogenously changing number of dimensions in which 
components of technologies are being recombined. In addition, it might be interesting to 
compare patterns of change from our model with empirical data. This would allow examining 
whether our model provides a better fit of real-world data than simple replicator dynamics. 
 
 
 
 25 
References 
Arifovic, J., 1994. Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control 18: 3-28.  
Arifovic, J., 1995. Genetic algorithm learning and inflationary economics. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 36: 219-243.  
Arrow, K.J., 1962. The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies 29, 
155-173. 
Aversi, R., Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G., Meacci, M., Olivetti, C., 1997. Demand dynamic with socially 
evolving preferences. IIASA International Institute for Applied System Analysis Interim 
Report IR-97-081. 
Axelrod, R., 1987. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoners dilemma. In: L., David, (Editor), 
Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing. Pitman, Boston, MA, pp. 32-41. 
Barton, N.H., 1995. A general model for the evolution of recombination. Genetical Research 65, 123-
144.   
Birchenhall, C.R., 1995. Review: genetic algorithms, classifier systems and genetic programming and 
their use in the models of adaptive behaviour and learning. Economic Journal 105, 788-795.   
Birchenhall, C.R., N. Kastrinos, Metcalfe, S., 1997. Genetic algorithms in evolutionary modelling. 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 7, 375-393. 
Boerlijst, M.C., S. Bonhoeffer, Nowak, M.A., 1996. Viral Quasi-Species and Recombination. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society London B  263, 1577-1584. 
Bomze, I., Burger, R., 1995. Stability by mutation in evolutionary games. Games and Economic 
Behaviour 11, 146-172.   
Berzel, Y., 1968. Optimal timing of innovations. The Review of Economics and Statistics 50: 348-355.  
Bull, J.J., L.A. Meyers, Lachmann, M., 2005. Quasispecies Made Simple. Computational Biology 1, 
450-461. 
Bulut, H., Moschini, G.C., 2005. Patents, trade secrets and the correlation among R&D projects. 
Economic Letters 91, 131-137. 
Canning, D., 1992. Average behaviour in learning models. Journal of Economic Theory 57, 442-472. 
Clayton, M.C., 2003. The Innovator‟s Dilemma. Harper Collins Publisher, New York. 
Curzon Price, T., 1997. Using co-evolutionary programming to stimulate strategic behaviours in 
markets. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 7: 219-254. 
Dasgupta, P., Maskin, E., 1987. The simple economics of research portfolios. Economic Journal 97, 
581-596. 
Dawid, H., Kopel, M., 1998. On economic applications of the genetic algorithm: a model of the 
cobweb type. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 8: 297-315. 
Diamond, J., 2005. Guns, Germs and Steel. Vintage Books, London.  
EIA 2008. Annual Energy Outlook. The Energy Information Administration, The U.S. Department of 
Energy. 
Eiben, A.E., Smith, J.E.,  2003. Introduction To Evolutionary Computing, Springer. 
Eigen, M., 1971. Self-organization of matter and the evolution of biological macromolecules. 
Naturwiss. 58, 465–523. 
Eigen, M., Schuster, P., 1979. The Hypercycle: A Principle of Natural Self-Organization. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin. 
Feldman, M.W., F.B. Christiansen, Brooks, L.D., 1980. Evolution of recombination in a constant 
environment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. USA 77, 4838-4841.  
Fleming, L., Sorenson, O., 2001. Technology as a complex adaptive system. Res. Pol. 30, 1019-1039. 
Foster, D., Young, P., 1990. Stochastic evolutionary games. Theoretical Population Biology 38, 219-
232. 
Friedman, M. 1953. On the methodology of positive economics. In: M. Friedman, Essays in Positive 
Economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Granstrand, O., 1998. Towards a theory of the technology-based firm. Research Policy 27, 465-489. 
Hadeler, K.P., 1981. Stable polymorphisms in a selection model with mutation. SIAM Journal Applied 
Mathematics 41, 1-7. 
Hofbauer, J., 1985. The selection mutation equation. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 23, 41-53. 
Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K., 2003. Evolutionary game dynamics. Bulletin of the American Mathematical 
Society 4, 479-519. 
Iwai, K., 1984a. Schumpeterian dynamics, part I: evolutionary model of innovation and imitation. 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 5, 159–90. 
Iwai, K., 1984b. Schumpeterian dynamics, part II: Technological progress. Firm growth and economic 
selection. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 5, 321-51. 
 26 
Jacobi, M.N., Nordahl, M. 2006. Quasispecies and recombination. Theoretical Population Biology 
70(4), 479-485. 
Jordan, D.W., Smith, P., 2007. Nonlinear Ordinary Differential Equations. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford (4
th 
edition). 
Kandori, S.A., G.J. Mailath, Rob, R., 1993. Learning, Mutations, and Long Run Equilibrium in Games. 
Econometrica 61, 29-56.  
Kimura, M., 1967. Evolutionary rate at the molecular level. Nature 217: 624-626. 
Komarowa, N., 2004. Replicator-mutator equation, universality property and population dynamics of 
learning. Journal of Theoretical Biology 230, 227-239. 
Kwasnicki, W., Kwasnicka, H., 1992. Market innovation competition: an evolutionary model of 
industrial dynamics. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 19: 343-368. 
Loomes, G., Sugden, R., 2000. Incorporating a stochastic element into decision theories. European 
Economic Review 39: 641-648. 
Meltcafe, J.S., 1988. The diffusion of innovations: an interpretative survey. In: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., 
Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., Soete, L., (eds) Technical change and economic theory. Pinter 
Publishers, London, pp 560-589. 
Miller, J.H., 1996. The coevolution of automata in the repeated prisoners dilemma. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization 29: 87-112.  
Mokyr, J., 1990. The Lever of the Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Nelson, R., Winter, S., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
Nowak, M.A., 1992. What is a quasi-species? Trends in Ecology and Evolution 7, 118-121. 
Nowak, M.A., 2006. Evolutionary Dynamics. Exploring the Equations of Life. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA.  
Nowak, M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2001. Evolution of universal grammar. Science 291, 114-
118. 
Nowak., M.A., Komarova, N.L., Niyogi, P., 2002. Computational and evolutionary aspects of 
language. Nature 417, 611-617. 
Nowak, M., Sigmund K., 1990. The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma. Acta 
Applied Mathematics 20, 247-265.  
Nowak, M., Sigmund K., 2004. Evolutionary dynamics in biological games. Science 3030, 796-798. 
Olsson, O., Frey B.S., 2002. Entrepreneurship as recombinant growth. Small Business Economics 19, 
69-80. 
Page, K., Nowak M., 2002. Unifying evolutionary dynamics. Journal of Theoretical Biology 219, 93-
98. 
Safarzynska, K., van den Bergh J.C.J.M., 2010. Evolutionary modelling in economics: a survey of 
methods and building blocks. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 20(3), 329-373. 
Samuelson, L., 1997. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Schuster, P., Swetina, J., 1988. Stationary mutant distribution and evolutionary optimization. Bulletin 
of Mathematical Biology 50, 635–660. 
Saviotti, P.P., Mani, G.S., 1995. Competition, variety and technological evolution: a replicator 
dynamics model. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 5, 369-392. 
Saviotti, P.P., Pyka, A., 2004. Economic development by the creation of new sectors. Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics 14:1-35. 
Silverberg, G., Dosi, G., Orsenigo, L., 1988. Innovation diversity and diffusion: a self-organization 
model. Economic Journal 98:1032–54. 
Silverberg, G., Lehnert, D., 1993. Long waves and 'evolutionary chaos' in a simple Schumpeterian 
model of embodied technical change. Structural. Change and Economic Dynamics 4, 9-37. 
Soete, L., Turner, R., 1984. Technology diffusion and the rate of technological change. The Economic 
Journal 375: 612-623. 
Stadler, P.F., Schuster, P., 1992. Mutation in autocatalytic reaction networks- an analysis based on 
perturbation theory. Journal of Mathematical Biology 30, 597-632.  
Taylor, P.D., Jonker, L., 1978. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical 
Bioscience 40, 145-156. 
Tsur, Y., Zemel, A., 2007. Towards endogenous recombinant growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control 31, 3459-3477.   
van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., 2008. Optimal diversity: Increasing returns versus recombinant innovation. 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 68, 565-580. 
 27 
Watson, R.A., 2006. Compositional Evolution: The Impact of Sex, Symbiosis, and Modularity on the 
Gradualist Framework of Evolution. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Weitzman, M.L., 1998. Recombinant growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 331-360. 
Wiggins, S., 2003. Introduction to Applied Nonlinear Dynamical Systems and Chaos. Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg: New York (2
nd
 edition).  
Willensdorfer, M., Nowak, M., 2005. Mutation in evolutionary games can increase average fitness at 
equilibrium. Journal of Theoretical Biology 237, 355-362. 
Windrum, P., 2007. Neo-Schumpeterian simulation models. In: Hanusch, H., Pyka, A, (eds) Elgar 
Companion to Neo-Schumpeterian Economics, Edward Elgar, UK, pp 405-439.  
Windrum, P., Birchenhall, C.T., 1998. Is life cycle theory a special case?: dominant designs and 
emergence of market niches through co-evolutionary learning. Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics 9: 109-134. 
Windrum, P., Birchenhall, C.T., 2005. Structural change in the presence of network externalities: a co-
evolutionary model of technological successions. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 15: 123-
148. 
Winter, S.G., 1964. Economic „natural selection‟ and the theory of the firm. Yale Economic Essays 4, 
225-72. 
Wolfram Research Inc., 2001. Mathematica, Version 4.1, Champaign, IL. 
Yildizoglu, M., 2002. Competing R&D Strategies in an Evolutionary Industry Model. Computational 
Economics 19, 51-65.  
Young, H.P., 1993. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61, 57-84.  
Young, H.P., 1996. The economics of conventions. Journal of Economic Perspective 10, 105-122.  
 
 28 
APPENDIX 
A1. Parameter values 
 
Table A1. Parameter settings corresponding to different trajectories depicted in Figures 2a-f, 
6a-f and 8a-f. 
 
Trajectory Fixed parameters per trajectory 
 
(always a=b=g=1, 
 β1=β2=0.05, and β3=0.35) 
Variation in parameter values 
Figures 2a,b, 
6a,b and 
8a,b  
(always μ=0) 
Figures 2c,d, 
6c,d  
and 8c,d  
(always r=0) 
Figures 2e,f, 
6e,f  
and 8e,f 
1 c10=0.1, c20=0.2, c30=0.4, δ=0.5,  r=0.5 μ=0.6 r=0.5, μ=0.6 
2 c10=0.4, c20=0.2, c30=0.4, δ=0.25 r=0.15 μ=0.3 r=0.15, μ=0.3 
3 c10=0.2, c20=0.2, c30=0.4, δ=0.5 r=0.2 μ=0.6 r=0.2, μ=0.6 
4 c10=0.1, c20=0.5, c30=0.2, δ=0.1 r=0.2 μ=0.2 r=0.2, μ=0.2 
5 c10=0.1, c20=0.2, c30=0.4, δ=0.5 r=0.9 μ=0.2 r=0.9, μ=0.2 
6 c10=0.3, c20=0.2, c30=0.9, δ=0.5 r=0.01 μ=0.1 r=0.01, μ=0.1 
7 c10=0.9, c20=0.2, c30=0.1, δ=0.6 r=0.7 μ=0.4 r=0.7, μ=0.4 
  8* c10=0.1, c20=0.2, c30=0.7, δ=0.9 r=0.2 μ=0.9 r=0.2, μ=0.9 
9 c10=0.7, c20=0.1, c30=0.4, δ=0.9 r=0.8 μ=0.7 r=0.8, μ=0.7 
10 c10=0.5, c20=0.2, c30=0.4, δ=0.3 r=0.8 μ=0.5 r=0.8, μ=0.5 
 
Note:* Trajectory 8 is not depicted in Figures 8c to 8f, as the dynamics result in values of technology shares of 
investments falling outside the plausible range [0,1]. 
 
 
A2. Eigenvalues 
 
To examine the stability of the above equilibria, we checked the eigenvalues of a linear 
approximation of the system. In general, if all the eigenvalues of the linear system have 
negative real parts, then the linear approximation is asymptotically stable, and so is the non-
linear system (Jordan and Smith, 2007). If at least one eigenvalue has a positive real part, then 
the equilibrium point will be unstable. Table A2 shows the eigenvalues for each equilibrium.  
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Table A2. Eigenvalues corresponding to solutions 1-4 of Table 1 
Solution Eigenvalues (λ1, λ2, λ3) 
1 (f1-f3,f2-f3,-f3) 
2 (-f2, - f2+ f3, f1- f2-δr) 
3 (-f1, -f1+f3,-f1+f2-r(δα-1)) 
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A3. Derivation of recombination rates  
The recombination and mutation rates that minimize the average cost of the system in the 
equilibrium implies: 
0


r
cx ii i
 or  0



ii i
cx
, 
with μ =0 and r=0, respectively. 
The exercise of deriving the optimal recombination and mutation rates can be only 
conducted where the exact solutions of the system are found. For the model version with 
constant unit costs, and in the absence of mutation, the optimal recombination rate that 
minimizes the average cost for the solution that corresponds to the coexistence of different 
technological options (solution 5 in Table 1) is: 
r = 
)(
)1()1(
2
20102030



 cccc
.        
Here, the optimal recombination rate depends on the weights δ and 1-δ at which Technologies 
1 and 2 are recombined and on the relative costs of technologies. 
9
 
In the version of the model with unit costs decreasing over time, and in the absence of 
mutation, the optimal recombination rate that maximizes the average fitness for the solution 
corresponding to the coexistence of three options (solution 6 in Table 2) is given by: 
r=


)1)()(( 30
20103010203020301030201020


cagtabgtb
agtcgtacccabcabcagtcagtcccabcccabc . 
Here, in the limit of t → ∞, r=0. 
                                                 
9
 If a single technology i dominates a market (Solution 2-4 in Table 1), the average costs are equal to 
ii xc 0 , i.e. unaffected by r.   
 
